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Abstract 
The service delivery process could be regarded as a complex system that should be taken possible 
influences into account. When services don’t meet customer needs and expectations, service failures 
immediately occur in service encounters. Consequently, service providers have to immediately propose 
solutions to deal with service failures. Service providers need to appraise several conditions of service 
failures including the levels of failures, the amount of existing resource and the types of customer 
personalities. This study aims to propose a systematical service recovery mechanism for service providers 
to make the appropriate decision to implement service recovery by applying game theory. Besides, this 
study is also to probe the influence of different customer personalities within service failures. 
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Introduction 
In the era of service economy, service providers endeavor to provide customers with quality services to 
achieve high satisfaction. High customer satisfaction can lead to high customer loyalty and business 
reputations which can reinforce word of mouth in order to increase profits (Heskett et al., 1994). 
Accordingly, service providers have to understand customer needs and expectations to offer valuable 
services to customers for maintaining the long-term relationship. Customers not only take part in activities 
of the service delivery process but also co-create valuable merits during service delivery. That is, both 
service providers and customers can achieve the win-win goal (Magnini et al., 2007). 
Designing and proposing appropriate services become an important research topic. Zeithaml et al. (1985) 
mentioned that there are four main features including intangibility, perishability, heterogeneity and 
inseparability to represent a service. That is, it is very difficult for service providers to create and design a 
quality service in accordance with the nature of above features. Meanwhile, customer needs and 
expectations could be extremely different and variable depended on customers’ backgrounds, cultures or 
educations. The customer factors would be also critical effects on the success of the service delivery 
process. 
As aforementioned, the service delivery process could be regarded as a complex system that should be 
taken possible influences into account. When services don’t meet customer needs and expectations, service 
failures immediately occur in service encounters (Ha and Jang, 2009). It goes without saying that service 
failures could lead customer dissatisfaction and negative business reputations. Customers will not be 
willing to purchase services next time that can decrease customer retention and business profits. 
Consequently, service providers have to immediately propose solutions to deal with service failures. Cong 
and Fu (2008) noted that service providers should prepare useful compensation to recover the damage of 
service failures and enable customers to be satisfied with recovery solutions again. Service recovery plays a 
critical role to resolve service failures. 
Service providers have to make effort to faultlessly remedy service failures in order to re-acquire customer 
satisfaction and trust. It seems that service providers should use their entire resources to prepare the 
solutions of service recovery. However, to our knowledge, service providers need to appraise several 
conditions of service failures including the levels of failures, the amount of existing resource and the types 
of customer personalities. In other words, service providers should dynamically make decisions of service 
recovery according to the changeable service contexts and the above conditions.  
Consequently, based on the core concept of customer satisfaction, service providers still should consider 
their existing resources and the levels of service failures to flexibly provide customers with suitable 
compensation. This study attempts to explore the following research questions: 1) how can service 
providers effectively and dynamically offer the optimal service recovery decision? 2) how can service 
providers adopt customer personalities to service recovery? According to research questions, this study 
aims to propose a systematical service recovery mechanism for service providers to make the appropriate 
decision to implement service recovery by applying game theory. Besides, this study is also to probe the 
influence of different customer personalities within service failures. 
 
Signaling Game 
Game theory can be regarded as a decision tool to help players to analyze the actions, benefits and 
shortcomings of the stakeholders to make right decisions (MacKenzie and Wicker, 2001). Players in the 
game can carefully examine the results of all possible conditions based on the strategic thinking. A game is 
composed of nature, player, strategy, action, information, outcome, equilibrium, payoff and outcome 
(Munck, 2001). Hence, different games can be generated by the diverse combinations of components. 
In the scenario of service recovery, customers always propose complaints first when they encounter service 
failures. Service providers then offer suitable solutions of service recovery after receiving customer 
complaints. According to the scenario, this study adopts signaling game to analyze the actions and 
strategies in the game of service recovery. Signal game is to demonstrate the game of incomplete 
information that players can’t perform their actions and information at the same time. That is, one player 
is considered as an information sender (i.e., customers) and the other is an information receiver (i.e., 
service providers) (Gibbons, 1997). 
The steps of signal game in detail are as follows: 
1. The creator of a game is “Nature” who dominates which players can join the game. 
2. Only senders can understand their decision types (tI). Messages can be represented as 
M={m1,m2,…,mJ}. Hence, the information of senders is mJ. 
3. Receivers do not recognize what senders’ types directly. Receivers have to analyze mJ to understand 
the senders’ decision types. 
4. Decision types can be represented as T={t1,t2,…,tI}. The probability of each decision type can be 
belonged to p(tI). p(tI)>0 and p(t1)+p(t2)+…+p(tI)=1. 
5. Actions can be implemented based on both senders and receivers’ decision types and messages. 
Actions can be represented as A={a1,a2,…,aK}. The probability of each action can be belonged to q(tI). 
q(tI)>0 and q(t1)+q(t2)+…+q(tI)=1. 
6. US (tI,mJ,aK) and UR (tI,mJ,aK) are represented as senders and receivers’ payoffs respectively. 
As shown in figure 1, the sender (who belongs to specific decision type, t1) can decide to deliver either m1 
message or m2 message. There are four strategies of senders in the model as follows:  
 Strategy 1: If a sender belongs to t1, m1 message could be sent by t1. Besides, a sender who belongs 
to t2 delivers m2 message. 
 Strategy 2: If a sender belongs to t1, m2 message could be sent by t1. Besides, a sender who belongs 
to t2 delivers m1 message. 
 Strategy 3: all senders delver m1 message. 
 Strategy 4: all senders delver m2 message. 
After a sender selects a decision type and delivers a message, a receiver can choose a suitable strategy and 
an action to acquire the optimal benefits.  
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Figure 1. The model of signaling game 
 
 
Service Recovery Mechanism 
As mentioned earlier, customer needs and expectations can be affected by their backgrounds, cultures, 
educations etc. Personality traits are the important factor to influence how customers think and expect for 
services. Costa and Mccare (1992) divided personality traits into five types including neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. DeWitt et al. (2008) proposed that 
extraversion and neuroticism personality traits have high influences on customer emotions and behaviors. 
Accordingly, this study tries to adopt extraversion and neuroticism personality traits as the decision types 
of senders in a service recovery game. 
Based on the idea of signaling game and personality traits, this study attempts to propose a service 
recovery mechanism (as shown in figure2). During service delivery, a customer can be served by a service 
delivered from a service provider which means service encounters. When a service can’t meet customer 
needs and expectations, service failures would immediately occur. The customer could complain about the 
dissatisfactory service for the service providers. Then, after the service provider receives the complaints, 
the service provider has to clarify the causes of service failures and analyzes the personality traits of the 
customer.  
Based on the analyzed information, the service provider can select an appropriate strategy of service 
recovery and implement the recovery solutions and actions. The approach of signaling game is applied into 
above processes. If the results of service recovery are not satisfied with customers, the executed 
implements can be modified and returned to the beginning of the mechanism which enables the service 
provider to adjust the recovery strategies, solutions and actions. The quality service recovery can lead to 
increase customer satisfaction, loyalty, retention and positive word of mouth. 
 
 Figure 2. The service recovery mechanism 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The extension model of signaling game for service recovery 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that “Nature” dispatches the decision type of a customer. The probability of the 
extraversion type (so-called E-type) is about p and the probability of the neuroticism type (so-called 
N-type) is about 1-p. A customer has two messages including complain (C) and non-complain (N-C) when 
encountering service failures. Meanwhile, the probabilities of non-complain of the extraversion and 
neuroticism types are defined as q and 1-q respectively. The probabilities of complain of the extraversion 
and neuroticism types are defined as q’ and 1-q’ respectively.  
p 
1-p 
Extraversion 
Neuroticism 
q’ q 
1-q’ 1-q 
N-C C 
Nature 
N-C C 
 Table 1. The settings and definitions of customers’ parameters in the payoff 
 
Table 2. The settings and definitions of service providers’ parameters in the payoff 
 
In order to deal with service failures, a service provider should provide a customer with the service 
recovery strategies. The actions to implement service recovery strategies include the solutions of low 
resources and high resources.  and  represents that a service provider delivers the solution of high 
resources and low resources respectively to a customer who actively complains about service failures. 
Moreover,  and represents that a service provider delivers the solution of high resources and 
low resources respectively to a customer who does not complain about service failures. The payoff of each 
solution (i.e., , ,  and ) can be also represented as payoff(customer, service provider). For 
example, the payoffs of  and  can be represented as ( ， ) and ( ， ). 
The settings and definitions of all parameters in the payoff are detailed in table 1 and table 2. 
 
Parameter Settings and definitions 
Damage (D) (Different Types of Customers Feel Different Degrees of Failure) 
/ (Others Feel about the severity of Failures) 
Compensate (C) (Compensate) / (The Max Compensate) 
Recovery emotion (Re) 1. Questionnaire 
2. w1* Emotional calm +w2* Satisfy +w3* 
Anger(Negative)+w4* Despair (Negative)+w5* The degree of 
attention (Positive or Negative)。 
Participation Value (Pv) The Number of Service Providers Improve After Receipt the 
Complain / The Number of Service Providers Receipt the 
Complain 
Complaining Cost (Cc) w6*Time(Cct)+ w7* Effort(Cce)+w8* Image and reputation(Ccr) 
Parameter Settings and definitions 
Positive-Word of Mouth 
(P-WOM) 
(The Number of Customer Who is Introduced by Existing Customers) 
/ (The Number of Existing Customers) 
Negative-Word of Mouth 
(N-WOM) 
( The Number of Customer Who Had Heard About the Service 
Provider’s WOM) / ( The Number of Existing Customers ) 
Customer Satisfaction (Cs) Questionnaire 
Customer Retention (Cr) (The Number of Customer Who Had Received the Service Provider’s 
Recovery) / (The Number of Service Providers Has Remedied ) 
Recovery Cost (Rc) I*Time(Rtc)+m*Labor(Rhc)+n*Money(Rmc) 
1. I* Time (Rtc)=The Time of Recovery Cost(h)/Times of 
Firm Operating a day(h) 
2. m*Labor(Rhc)=The Number of Person that Recovery Cost 
/The Number of Person that Current Firm Has 
3. Money (Rmc)= Compensation Normalized 
 Labor need* Weights(wi) 
Mechanism Demonstration  
There are two kinds of equilibrium in a signal game including separating equilibrium and pooling 
equilibrium (Gibbons, 1997). Separating equilibrium is the equilibrium that senders can clearly show their 
decision types and actions. Receivers can effectively propose suitable responses to senders by recognizing 
the posterior probabilities. On the contrary, pooling equilibrium is the equilibrium that senders with 
different decision types propose the same actions. Receivers only predict the decision types of senders by 
computing the prior probabilities. This study uses a separating equilibrium to demonstrate the service 
recovery mechanism. 
 
Figure 4. Separating equilibrium  
 
Figure 4 shows a scenario of separating equilibrium. Given a service provider provides N-type customers 
with the solution of , N-type customers could deliver negative word of mouth because their negative 
thinking. If a service provider provides N-type customers with the solution of , they can be resolved 
by the solutions of service recovery and lead to high customer satisfaction.  
The demonstration is detailed as follows. Since  =  + + CsH + CrH + RcH and 
=  + + CsL + CrL + RcL. Based on CrH CrL, , CsH CsL, and 
, we can get the results . That is, RcH . Because  + + CsH 
+ CrH + RcH  + + CsL + CrL + RcL, we can acquire > . Consequently, for a 
service provider, the payoff ( ) is larger than the payoff ( ). A service provider would like to 
select the advantage strategy of the solution of . Consequently, the service recovery mechanism based 
on the idea of signaling game can be demonstrated by the scenario of separating equilibrium.  
 
Conclusions 
When service failures occur during service delivery, service providers have to immediately deal with 
customer complaints in order to increase customer satisfaction and retention. This study is to build a 
service recovery mechanism by adopting the notion of signaling game that can help service providers to 
propose suitable responses to recover service failures. Traditionally, service providers have to pay all 
efforts in recovering service failures for customers by using their resources. However, the way does not 
achieve economic benefits. Hence, the recovery strategies and executions should be based on the levels of 
service failures and the amount of resources. Service providers can dynamically propose proper solutions 
by taking the amount of existing resources into account. The cost saving, dynamically recovery executions 
and customers maintaining are the core benefits for the service providers. This study is still working in 
progress. In the future, the scenarios of the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium will be 
necessary to evaluate the feasibility and reliability of the service recovery mechanism.  
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